

Trustworthy Systems
<http://ssrg.nicta.com.au/>



seL4 Reference Manual

API version 1.2

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The seL4 microkernel is an operating-system kernel designed to be a secure, safe, and reliable foundation for systems in a wide variety of application domains. As a microkernel, it provides a small number of services to applications, such as abstractions to create and manage virtual address spaces, threads, and inter-process communication (IPC). The small number of services provided by seL4 directly translates to a small implementation of approximately 8700 lines of C code. This has allowed the ARMv6 version of the kernel to be formally proven in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover to adhere to its formal specification [Boy09, CKS08, DEK⁺06, EKE08, KEH⁺09, TKN07, WKS⁺09].

This manual describes the seL4 kernel's API from a user's point of view. The document starts by giving a brief overview of the seL4 microkernel design, followed by a reference of the high-level API exposed by the seL4 kernel to userspace.

While we have tried to ensure that this manual accurately reflects the behaviour of the seL4 kernel, this document is by no means a formal specification of the kernel. When the precise behaviour of the kernel under a particular circumstance needs to be known, users should refer to the seL4 abstract specification, which gives a formal description of the seL4 kernel.

Chapter 2

Kernel Services and Objects

A limited number of service primitives are provided by the microkernel; more complex services may be implemented as applications on top of these primitives. In this way, the functionality of the system can be extended without increasing the code and complexity in privileged mode, while still supporting a potentially wide number of services for varied application domains.

The basic services seL4 provides are as follows:

Threads are an abstraction of CPU execution that supports running software;

Address spaces are virtual memory spaces that each contain an application. Applications are limited to accessing memory in their address space;

Inter-process communication (IPC) via *endpoints* allows threads to communicate using message passing;

Device primitives allow device drivers to be implemented as unprivileged applications. The kernel exports hardware device interrupts via IPC messages; and

Capability spaces store capabilities (i.e., access rights) to kernel services along with their book-keeping information.

This chapter gives an overview of these services, describes how kernel objects are accessed by userspace applications, and describes how new objects can be created.

2.1 Capability-based Access Control

The seL4 microkernel provides a capability-based access-control model. Access control governs all kernel services; in order to perform an operation, an application must *invoke* a capability in its possession that has sufficient access rights for the requested service. With this, the system can be configured to isolate software components from each other, and also to enable authorised, controlled communication between components by selectively granting specific communication capabilities. This enables software-component isolation with a high degree of assurance, as only those operations explicitly authorised by capability possession are permitted.

A capability is an unforgeable token that references a specific kernel object (such as a thread control block) and carries access rights that control what methods may be invoked. Conceptually, a capability resides in an application's *capability space*; an address in this space refers to a *slot* which may or may not contain a capability. An application may refer to a capability—to request a kernel service, for example—using the address of the slot holding that capability. This means, the seL4 capability model is an instance of a *segregated* (or *partitioned*) capability model, where capabilities are managed by the kernel.

Capability spaces are implemented as a directed graph of kernel-managed *capability nodes* (CNodes). A CNode is a table of slots, where each slot may contain further CNode capabilities. An address in a capability space is then the concatenation of the indices of the CNode capabilities forming the path to the destination slot; we discuss CNode objects in detail in Chapter 3.

Capabilities can be copied and moved within capability spaces, and also sent via IPC. This allows creation of applications with specific access rights, the delegation of authority to another application, and passing to an application authority to a newly created (or selected) kernel service. Furthermore, capabilities can be *minted* to create a derived capability with a subset of the rights of the original capability (never with more rights). A newly minted capability can be used for partial delegation of authority.

Capabilities can also be revoked to withdraw authority. Revocation recursively removes any capabilities that have been derived from the original capability being revoked. The propagation of capabilities through the system is controlled by a *take-grant*-based model [EKE08, Boy09].

2.2 System Calls

The seL4 kernel provides a message-passing service for communication between threads. This mechanism is also used for communication with kernel-provided services. There is a standard message format, each message containing a number of data words and possibly some capabilities. The structure and encoding of these messages are described in detail in Chapter 4.

Threads send messages by invoking capabilities within their capability space. When an endpoint capability is invoked in this way the message will be transferred through the kernel to another thread. When capabilities to kernel objects are invoked, the message will be interpreted as a method invocation in a manner specific to the type of kernel object. For example, invoking a thread control block (TCB) capability with a correctly formatted message will suspend the target thread.

The kernel provides the following system calls:

`seL4.Send()` delivers a message through the named capability and then allows the application to continue. If the invoked capability is an endpoint and no receiver is ready to receive the message immediately, the sending thread will be blocked until the message can be delivered. No error code or response will be returned by the receiving thread or kernel object.

`seL4_NBSend()` performs a non-blocking send. It is similar to `seL4_Send()` except that if the message cannot be received immediately, the message is silently dropped. Like `seL4_Send()`, no error code or response will be returned by the object.

`seL4_Call()` is a `seL4_Send()` that blocks the sending thread until a reply message is received. When the sent message is delivered to another thread (via an `Endpoint`), an additional ‘*reply*’ capability is added to the message and delivered to the receiver to give it the right to reply to the sender. The reply capability is stored in a special purpose slot in the receiver’s TCB. When invoking capabilities to kernel services, using `seL4_Call()` allows the kernel to return an error code or other response within a reply message.

`seL4_Wait()` is used by a thread to receive messages through endpoints. If no message is ready to be sent, the thread will block until a message is sent. This system call works only on endpoint capabilities, raising a fault (see section 5.2) when attempted with other capability types.

`seL4_Reply()` is used to respond to a `seL4_Call()`, using the capability generated by the `seL4_Call()` system call and stored in the replying thread’s TCB. It delivers the message to the calling thread, waking it in the process.

There is space for only one reply capability in each thread’s TCB, so the `seL4_Reply()` syscall can be used to reply to the most recent caller only. The `seL4_CNode_SaveCaller()` method that will be described later can be used to save the reply capability into regular capability space, where it can be used with `seL4_Send()`.

`seL4_ReplyWait()` is a combination of `seL4_Reply()` and `seL4_Wait()`. It exists for efficiency reasons: the common case of replying to a request and waiting for the next can be performed in a single kernel system call instead of two.

`seL4_Yield()` is the only system call that does not require a capability to be used. It causes the calling thread to give up the remainder of its timeslice to another runnable thread of the same priority level. If there are no runnable threads with the same priority, the calling thread is resumed and the system call has no effect.

2.3 Kernel Objects

In this section we give a brief overview of the kernel-implemented object types whose instances (also simply called *objects*) can be invoked by applications. The interface to these objects forms the interface to the kernel itself. The creation and use of the high-level kernel services is achieved by the creation, manipulation, and combination of these kernel objects:

CNodes (see Chapter 3) store capabilities, giving threads permission to invoke methods on particular objects. Each CNode has a fixed number of slots, always a power of two, determined when the CNode is created. Slots can be empty or contain a capability.

Thread Control Blocks (TCBs; see Chapter 5) represent a thread of execution in seL4. Threads are the unit of execution that is scheduled, blocked, unblocked, etc., depending on the application's interaction with other threads.

IPC Endpoints (see Chapter 4) may be used to facilitate interprocess communication between threads. The seL4 microkernel supports two types of endpoints:

- *Synchronous* endpoints (**Endpoint**), which cause the sending thread to block until its message is received; and
- *Asynchronous* endpoints (**AsyncEP**), which only allow short messages to be sent, but do not cause the sender to block.

A capability to an endpoint can be restricted to be send-only or receive-only. Additionally, capabilities to **Endpoint** objects may be configured to allow capabilities to be transferred across to other threads.

Virtual Address Space Objects (see Chapter 6) are used to construct a virtual address space (or **VSpace**) for one or more threads. These objects largely directly correspond to those of the hardware; that is, a page directory pointing to page tables, which in turn map physical frames. The kernel also includes **ASID Pool** and **ASID Control** objects for tracking the status of address spaces.

Interrupt Objects (see Chapter 7) give applications the ability to receive and acknowledge interrupts from hardware devices. Initially, there is a capability to **IRQControl**, which allows for the creation of **IRQHandler** capabilities. An **IRQHandler** capability permits the management of a specific interrupt source associated with a specific device. It is delegated to a device driver to access an interrupt source. The **IRQHandler** object allows threads to wait for and acknowledge individual interrupts.

Untyped Memory (see Section 2.4) is the foundation of memory allocation in the seL4 kernel. Untyped memory capabilities have a single method which allows the creation of new kernel objects. If the method succeeds, the calling thread gains access to capabilities to the newly-created objects. Additionally, untyped memory objects can be divided into a group of smaller untyped memory objects allowing delegation of part (or all) of the system's memory. We discuss memory management in general in the following sections.

2.4 Kernel Memory Allocation

The seL4 microkernel does not dynamically allocate memory for kernel objects. Kernel objects must be explicitly created from application-controlled memory regions via **Untyped Memory** capabilities. Applications must have explicit authority to memory (through these **Untyped Memory** capabilities) in order to create new objects, and all objects consume constant memory once created. These mechanisms can be used to precisely control the specific amount of physical memory available to applications, including being able to enforce isolation of physical memory access between applications

or a device. There are no arbitrary resource limits in the kernel apart from those dictated by the hardware¹, and so many denial-of-service attacks via resource exhaustion are avoided.

At boot time, seL4 pre-allocates the memory required for the kernel itself, including the code, data, and stack sections (seL4 is a single kernel-stack operating system). The remainder of the memory is given to the initial thread in the form of capabilities to Untyped Memory, and some additional capabilities to kernel objects that were required to bootstrap the initial thread. These Untyped Memory regions can then be split into smaller regions or other kernel objects using the `seL4_Untyped_Retype()` method; the created objects are termed *children* of the original untyped memory object.

The user-level application that creates an object using `seL4_Untyped_Retype()` receives full authority over the resulting object. It can then delegate all or part of the authority it possesses over this object to one or more of its clients.

2.4.1 Reusing Memory

The model described thus far is sufficient for applications to allocate kernel objects, distribute authority among client applications, and obtain various kernel services provided by these objects. This alone is sufficient for a simple static system configuration.

The seL4 kernel also allows Untyped Memory regions to be reused. Reusing a region of memory is allowed only when there are no dangling references (i.e., capabilities) left to the objects inside that memory. The kernel tracks *capability derivations*, i.e., the children generated by the methods `seL4_Untyped_Retype()`, `seL4_CNode_Mint()`, `seL4_CNode_Copy()`, and `seL4_CNode_Mutate()`.

The tree structure so generated is termed the *capability derivation tree* (CDT).² For example, when a user creates new kernel objects by retyping untyped memory, the newly created capabilities would be inserted into the CDT as children of the untyped memory capability.

For each Untyped Memory region, the kernel keeps a *watermark* recording how much of region has previously been allocated. Whenever a user requests the kernel to create new objects in an untyped memory region, the kernel will carry out one of two actions: if there are already existing objects allocated in the region, the kernel will allocate the new objects at the current watermark level, and increase the watermark. If all objects previously allocated in the region have been deleted, the kernel will reset the watermark and start allocating new objects from the beginning of the region again.

Finally, the `seL4_CNode_Revoke()` method provided by CNode objects destroys all capabilities derived from the argument capability. Revoking the last capability to a kernel object triggers the *destroy* operation on the now unreferenced object. This simply cleans up any in-kernel dependencies between it, other objects and the kernel.

By calling `seL4_CNode_Revoke()` on the original capability to an untyped memory object, the user removes all of the untyped memory object's children—that is, all

¹The treatment of virtual ASIDs imposes a fixed number of address spaces. This limitation is to be removed in future versions of seL4.

²Although the CDT conceptually is a separate data structure, it is implemented as part of the CNode object and so requires no additional kernel meta-data.

capabilities pointing to objects in the untyped memory region. Thus, after this invocation there are no valid references to any object within the untyped region, and the region may be safely retyped and reused.

Chapter 3

Capability Spaces

Recall from Section 2.1 that seL4 implements a capability-based access control model. Each userspace thread has an associated *capability space* (CSpace) that contains the capabilities that the thread possesses, thereby governing which resources the thread can access.

Recall that capabilities reside within kernel-managed objects known as CNodes. A CNode is a table of slots, each of which may contain a capability. This may include capabilities to further CNodes, forming a directed graph. Conceptually a thread's CSpace is the portion of the directed graph that is reachable starting with the CNode capability that is its CSpace root.

A CSpace address refers to an individual slot (in some CNode in the CSpace), which may or may not contain a capability. Threads refer to capabilities in their CSpaces (e.g. when making system calls) using the address of the slot that holds the capability in question. An address in a CSpace is the concatenation of the indices of the CNode capabilities forming the path to the destination slot; we discuss this further in Section 3.3.

Recall that capabilities can be copied and moved within CSpaces, and also sent in messages (message sending will be described in detail in Section 4.2.2). Furthermore, new capabilities can be *minted* from old ones with a subset of their rights. Recall, from Section 2.4.1, that seL4 maintains a *capability derivation tree* (CDT) in which it tracks the relationship between these copied capabilities and the originals. The revoke method removes all capabilities (in all CSpaces) that were derived from a selected capability. This mechanism can be used by servers to restore sole authority to an object they have made available to clients, or by managers of untyped memory to destroy the objects in that memory so it can be retyped.

seL4 requires the programmer to manage all in-kernel data structures, including CSpaces, from userspace. This means that the userspace programmer is responsible for constructing CSpaces as well as addressing capabilities within them. This chapter first discusses capability and CSpace management, before discussing how capabilities are addressed within CSpaces, i.e. how applications can refer to individual capabilities within their CSpaces when invoking methods.

3.1 Capability and CSpace Management

3.1.1 CSpace Creation

CSpaces are created by creating and manipulating CNode objects. When creating a CNode the user must specify the number of slots that it will have, and this determines the amount of memory that it will use. Each slot requires 16 bytes of physical memory and has the capacity to hold exactly one capability. Like any other object, a CNode must be created by calling `seL4_Untyped_Retype()` on an appropriate amount of untyped memory (see Section 9.3.26). The caller must therefore have a capability to enough untyped memory as well as enough free capability slots available in existing CNodes for the `seL4_Untyped_Retype()` invocation to succeed.

3.1.2 CNode Methods

Capabilities are managed largely through invoking CNode methods.

CNodes support the following methods:

`seL4_CNode_Mint()` creates a new capability in a specified CNode slot from an existing capability. The newly created capability may have fewer rights than the original and a different guard (see Section 3.3.1). `seL4_CNode_Mint()` can also create a badged capability (see Section 4.2.1) from an unbadged one.

`seL4_CNode_Copy()` is similar to `seL4_CNode_Mint()`, but the newly created capability has the same badge and guard as the original.

`seL4_CNode_Move()` moves a capability between two specified capability slots. You cannot move a capability to the slot in which it is currently.

`seL4_CNode_Mutate()` can move a capability similarly to `seL4_CNode_Move()` and also reduce its rights similarly to `seL4_CNode_Mint()`, although without an original copy remaining.

`seL4_CNode_Rotate()` moves two capabilities between three specified capability slots. It is essentially two `seL4_CNode_Move()` invocations: one from the second specified slot to the first, and one from the third to the second. The first and third specified slots may be the same, in which case the capability in it is swapped with the capability in the second slot. The method is atomic; either both or neither capabilities are moved.

`seL4_CNode_Delete()` removes a capability from the specified slot.

`seL4_CNode_Revoke()` is equivalent to calling `seL4_CNode_Delete()` on each derived child of the specified capability. It has no effect on the capability itself, except in very specific circumstances outlined in Section 3.2.

`seL4_CNode_SaveCaller()` moves a kernel-generated reply capability of the current thread from the special TCB slot it was created in, into the designated CSpace slot.

`seL4_CNode_Recycle()` is similar to `seL4_CNode_Revoke()`, except that it also resets some aspects of the object to its initial state.

3.1.3 Capability Rights

As mentioned previously, some capability types have *access rights* associated with them. Currently, access rights are associated with capabilities for Endpoints, AsyncEPs (see Chapter 4) and Pages (see Chapter 6). The access rights associated with a capability determine the methods that can be invoked. seL4 supports three orthogonal access rights, which are Read, Write and Grant. The meaning of each right is interpreted relative to the various object types, as detailed in Table 3.1.

When an object is first created, the initial capability that refers to it carries the maximum set of access rights. Other, less-powerful capabilities may be manufactured from this original capability, using methods such as `seL4_CNode_Mint()` and `seL4_CNode_Mutate()`. If a greater set of rights than the source capability is specified for the destination capability in either of these invocations, the destination rights are silently downgraded to those of the source.

Type	Read	Write	Grant
Endpoint	Required to wait.	Required to send.	Required to send capabilities (including reply capabilities).
AsyncEP	Required to wait.	Required to send.	N/A
Page	Required to map the page readable.	Required to map the page writable.	N/A

Table 3.1: seL4 access rights.

3.1.4 Capability Derivation Tree

As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, seL4 keeps track of capability derivations in a capability derivation tree.

Various methods, such as `seL4_CNode_Copy()` or `seL4_CNode_Mint()`, may be used to create derived capabilities. Not all capabilities support derivation. In general, only *original* capabilities support derivation invocations, but there are exceptions. Table 3.2 summarises the conditions that must be met for capability derivation to succeed for the various capability types, and how capability-derivation failures are reported in each case. The capability types not listed can be derived once.

Figure 3.1 shows an example capability derivation tree that illustrates a standard scenario: the top level is a large untyped capability, the second level splits this capability into two regions covered by their own untyped caps, both are children of the first level. The third level on the left is a copy of the level 2 untyped capability. Untyped capabilities when copied always create children, never siblings. In this scenario, the untyped capability was typed into two separate objects, creating two capabilities on

Cap Type	Conditions for Derivation	Error Code on Derivation Failure
ReplyCap	Cannot be derived	Dependent on syscall
IRQControl	Cannot be derived	Dependent on syscall
Untyped	Must not have children (Section 3.2)	<code>seL4_RevokeFirst</code>
Page Table	Must be mapped	<code>seL4_IllegalOperation</code>
Page Directory	Must be mapped	<code>seL4_IllegalOperation</code>
IO Page Table (IA-32 only)	Must be mapped	<code>seL4_IllegalOperation</code>

Table 3.2: Capability Derivation




Figure 3.1: Example capability derivation tree.

level 4, both are the original capability to the respective object, both are children of the untyped capability they were created from.

Ordinary original capabilities can have one level of derived capabilities. Further copies of these derived capabilities will create siblings, in this case remaining on level 5. There is an exception to this scheme for endpoint capabilities — they support an additional layer of depth with the concept of badged and unbadged endpoints. The original endpoint capability will be unbadged. Using the mint method, a copy of the capability with a specific badge can be created. This new, badged capability to the same object is treated as an original capability (the “original badged endpoint capability”) and supports one level of derived children like other capabilities.

3.2 Deletion, Revocation, and Recycling

Capabilities in seL4 can be deleted and revoked. Both methods primarily affect capabilities, but they can have side effects on objects in the system where the deletion or revocation results in the destruction of the last capability to an object.

As described above, `seL4_CNode_Delete()` will remove a capability from the specified CNode slot. Usually, this is all that happens. If, however, it was the last typed capability to an object, this object will now be destroyed by the kernel, cleaning up all remaining in-kernel references and preparing the memory for re-use.

If the object to be destroyed was a capability container, i.e. a TCB or CNode, the destruction process will delete each capability held in the container, prior to destroying the container. This may result in the destruction of further objects if the contained capabilities are the last capabilities.¹

The `seL4_CNode_Revoke()` method will `seL4_CNode_Delete()` all CDT children of the specified capability, but will leave the capability itself intact. If any of the revoked child capabilities were the last capabilities to an object, the appropriate destroy operation is triggered.

Note: `seL4_CNode_Revoke()` may only partially complete in two specific circumstances. The first being where a CNode containing the last capability to the TCB of the thread performing the revoke (or the last capability to the TCB itself) is deleted as a result of the revoke. In this case the thread performing the revoke is destroyed during the revoke and the revoke does not complete. The second circumstance is where the storage containing the capability that is the target of the revoke is deleted as a result of the revoke. In this case, the authority to perform the revoke is removed during the operation and the operation stops part way through. Both these scenarios can be and should be avoided at user-level by construction.

The `seL4_CNode_Recycle()` method can be used to partially reset an object without fully removing all capabilities to it. Invoking it will first revoke all child capabilities, but it will not remove siblings or parents. Only if, after revocation, the capability is the last typed capability to the object, the same destroy operation as in `seL4_CNode_Delete()` will be executed. Otherwise, not all aspects of the object will be reset: for badged endpoint capabilities, only IPC with this badge will be cancelled in the endpoint, for TCBs the capabilities will be reset, for CNodes, the guard on the capability will be reset.

Note that for page tables and page directories, neither `seL4_CNode_Revoke()` nor `seL4_CNode_Recycle()` will revoke frame capabilities mapped into the address space. They will only be unmapped from the space.

¹The recursion is limited as if the last capability to a CNode is found within the container, the found CNode is not destroyed. Instead, the found CNode is made unreachable by moving the capability pointing to the found CNode into the found cnode itself, by swapping the capability with the first capability in the found cnode, and then trying to delete the swapped capability instead. This breaks the recursion.

The result of this approach is that deleting the last cap to the root CNode of a CSpace does not recursively delete the entire CSpace. Instead, it deletes the root CNode, and the branches of the tree become unreachable, potentially including the deleting of some of the unreachable CNode's caps to make space for the self-referring capability. The practical consequence of this approach is that CSpace deletion requires user-level to delete the tree leaf first if unreachable CNodes are to be avoided. Alternatively, any resulting unreachable CNodes can be cleaned up via revoking a covering untyped capability, however this latter approach may be more complex to arrange by construction at user-level.

3.3 CSpace Addressing

When performing a system call, a thread specifies to the kernel the capability to be invoked by giving an address in its CSpace. This address refers to the specific slot in the caller's CSpace that contains the capability to be invoked.

CSpaces are designed to permit sparsity, and the process of looking-up a capability address must be efficient. Therefore, CSpaces are implemented as *guarded page tables*.

As explained earlier, a CSpace is simply a hierarchy of CNode objects, and each CNode is simply a table of slots that each contain either a capability or a reference to another CNode. The kernel stores a capability to the root CNode of each thread's CSpace in the thread's TCB. Conceptually, a CNode capability stores not only a reference to the CNode to which it refers, but also carries two values, its *guard* and *radix*.

3.3.1 Capability Address Lookup

Like a virtual memory address, a capability address is simply an integer. Rather than referring to a location of physical memory (as does a virtual memory address), a capability address refers to a capability slot. When looking up a capability address presented by a userspace thread, the kernel first consults the CNode capability in the thread's TCB that defines the root of the thread's CSpace. It then compares that CNode's *guard* value against the most significant bits of the capability address. If the two values are different, lookup fails. Otherwise, the kernel then uses the next most-significant *radix* bits of the capability address as an index into the CNode to which the CNode capability refers. The slot *s* identified by these next *radix* bits might contain another CNode capability or contain something else (including nothing). If *s* contains a CNode capability *c* and there are remaining bits (following the *radix* bits) in the capability address that have yet to be translated, the lookup process repeats, starting from the CNode capability *c* and using these remaining bits of the capability address. Otherwise, the lookup process terminates successfully; the capability address in question refers to the capability slot *s*.

Figure 3.2 demonstrates a valid CSpace with the following features:

- a top level CNode object with a 12-bit guard set to 0x000 and 256 slots;
- a top level CNode with direct object references;
- a top level CNode with two second-level CNode references;
- second level CNodes with different guards and slot counts;
- a second level CNode that contains a reference to a top level CNode;
- a second level CNode that contains a reference to another CNode where there are some bits remaining to be translated;
- a second level CNode that contains a reference to another CNode where there are no bits remaining to be translated; and
- object references in the second level CNodes.




Figure 3.3: An arbitrary CSpace layout

Cap A. The first CNode has a 4-bit guard set to 0x0, and an 8-bit radix. Cap A resides in slot 0x60 so it may be referred to by any address of the form 0x060xxxxx (where xxxxx is any number, because the translation process terminates after translating the first 12 bits of the address). For simplicity, we usually adopt the address 0x06000000.

Cap B. Again, the first CNode has a 4-bit guard set to 0x0, and an 8-bit radix. The second CNode is reached via the L2 CNode Cap. It also has a 4-bit guard of 0x0 and Cap B resides at index 0x60. Hence, Cap B's address is 0x00F06000. Translation of this address terminates after the first 24 bits.

Cap C. This capability is addressed via both CNodes. The third CNode is reached via the L3 CNode Cap, which resides at index 0x00 of the second CNode. The third CNode has no guard and Cap C is at index 0x60. Hence, its address is 0x00F00060. Translation of this address leaves 0 bits untranslatable.

Caps C–G. This range of capability slots is addressed by providing a base address (which refers to the slot containing Cap C) of 0x00F00060 and a window size of 5.

L2 CNode Cap. Recall that to address a CNode capability, the user must supply not only a capability address but also specify the depth limit, which is the maximum number of bits to be translated. L2 CNode Cap resides at offset 0x0F of the first CNode, which has a 4-bit guard of 0x0. Hence, its address is 0x00F00000, with a depth limit of 12 bits.

L3 CNode Cap. This capability resides at index 0x00 of the second CNode, which is reached by the L2 CNode Cap. The second CNode has a 4-bit guard of 0x0. Hence, the capability's address is 0x00F00000 with a depth limit of 24 bits. Note that the addresses of the L2 and L3 CNode Caps are the same, but that their depth limits are different.

In summary, to refer to any capability (or slot) in a CSpace, the user must supply its address. When the capability might be a CNode, the user must also supply a depth

limit. To specify a range of capability slots, the user supplies a starting address and a window size.

3.4 Lookup Failure Description

When a capability lookup fails, a description of the failure is given to either the calling thread or the thread's exception handler in its IPC buffer. The format of the description is always the same but may occur at varying offsets in the IPC buffer depending on how the error occurred. The description format is explained below. The first word indicates the type of lookup failure and the meaning of later words depend on this.

3.4.1 Invalid Root

A CSpace CPTR root (within which a capability was to be looked up) is invalid. For example, the capability is not a CNode cap.

Data	Meaning
Offset + 0	seL4.InvalidRoot

3.4.2 Missing Capability

A capability required for an invocation is not present or does not have sufficient rights.

Data	Meaning
Offset + 0	seL4.MissingCapability
Offset + 1	Bits left

3.4.3 Depth Mismatch

When resolving a capability, a CNode was traversed that resolved more bits than was left to decode in the CPTR or a non-CNode capability was encountered while there were still bits remaining to be looked up.

Data	Meaning
Offset + 0	seL4.DepthMismatch
Offset + 1	Bits of CPTR remaining to decode
Offset + 2	Bits that the current CNode being traversed resolved

3.4.4 Guard Mismatch

When resolving a capability, a CNode was traversed with a guard size larger than the number of bits remaining or the CNode's guard did not match the next bits of the CPTR being resolved.

Data	Meaning
Offset + 0	seL4.GuardMismatch
Offset + 1	Bits of CPTR remaining to decode
Offset + 2	The CNode's guard
Offset + 3	The CNode's guard size

Chapter 4

Inter-process Communication

The seL4 microkernel provides a message-passing mechanism for communication between threads. The mechanism is also used for communication with kernel-provided services. Messages are sent by invoking a capability to a kernel object. Messages sent to *synchronous* (Endpoint) and *asynchronous* (AsyncEP) IPC endpoints are destined for other threads; messages sent to objects of other types are processed by the kernel. This chapter describes the common message format, the two types of endpoints, and how they can be used for communication between applications.

4.1 Message Registers

Each message contains a number of message words and optionally a number of capabilities. The message words are sent to or received from a thread by placing them in its *message registers*. The message registers are numbered and the first few message registers are implemented using physical CPU registers, while the rest are backed by a fixed region of memory called the *IPC buffer*. The reason for this design is efficiency: very short messages need not use the memory. The physical CPU registers used for the message registers are described in Table 4.1 for x86 and Table 4.2 for ARM. The IPC buffer is assigned to the calling thread (see Section 5.1 and Section 9.3.20).

Role	CPU Register
Capability register (<i>in</i>)	ebx
Badge register (<i>out</i>)	ebx
Message tag (<i>in/out</i>)	esi
Message register 1 (<i>in/out</i>)	edi
Message register 2 (<i>in/out</i>)	ebp

Table 4.1: Physical register allocation for IPC messages on the x86 architecture.

Every IPC message also has a tag (structure `seL4_MessageInfo`). The tag consists of four fields: the label, message length, number of capabilities (the `extraCaps` field) and the `capsUnwrapped` field. The message length and number of capabilities determine

Role	CPU Register
Capability register (<i>in</i>)	r0
Badge register (<i>out</i>)	r0
Message tag (<i>in/out</i>)	r1
Message register 1–4 (<i>in/out</i>)	r2 – r5

Table 4.2: Physical register allocation for IPC messages on the ARM architecture.

either the number of message registers and capabilities that the sending thread wishes to transfer, or the number of message registers and capabilities that were actually transferred. The label is not interpreted by the kernel and is passed unmodified as the first data payload of the message. The label may, for example, be used to specify a requested operation. The `capsUnwrapped` field is used only on the receive side, to indicate the manner in which capabilities were received. It is described in Section 4.2.2.

Type	Name	Description
<code>seL4_MessageInfo</code>	<code>tag</code>	Message tag
<code>seL4_Word[]</code>	<code>msg</code>	Message contents
<code>seL4_Word</code>	<code>reserved</code>	Reserved
<code>seL4_CPtr[]</code> (<i>in</i>)	<code>caps</code>	Capabilities to transfer
<code>seL4_CapData[]</code> (<i>out</i>)	<code>badges</code>	Badges for endpoint capabilities received
<code>seL4_CPtr</code>	<code>receiveCNode</code>	CPTR to a CNode from which to find the receive slot
<code>seL4_CPtr</code>	<code>receiveIndex</code>	CPTR to the receive slot relative to <code>receiveCNode</code>
<code>seL4_Word</code>	<code>receiveDepth</code>	Number of bits of <code>receiveIndex</code> to use

Table 4.3: Fields of the `seL4_IPCBuffer` structure. Note that `badges` and `caps` use the same area of memory in the structure.

The kernel assumes that the IPC buffer contains a structure of type `seL4_IPCBuffer` as defined in Table 4.3. The kernel uses as many physical registers as possible to transfer IPC messages. When more arguments are transferred than physical message registers are available, the kernel begins using the IPC buffer’s `msg` field to transfer arguments. However, it leaves room in this array for the physical message registers. For example, if an IPC transfer or kernel object invocation required 4 message registers (and there are only 2 physical message registers available on this architecture) then arguments 1 and 2 would be transferred via message registers and arguments 3 and 4 would be in `msg[2]` and `msg[3]`. This allows the user-level object-invocation stubs to copy the arguments passed in physical registers to the space left in the `msg` array if desired. The situation is similar for the tag field. There is space for this field in the `seL4_IPCBuffer` structure, which the kernel ignores. User level stubs may wish to copy the message tag from its CPU register to this field, although the user level stubs provided with the kernel do not do this.

4.2 Synchronous Endpoints

Synchronous endpoints (or simply Endpoints) allow a small amount of data and small number of capabilities (namely the IPC buffer) to be transferred between two threads. Endpoints are called ‘synchronous’ because a message transfer will not take place until both the sender is ready to send the message and a receiver is ready to receive it.

Endpoint objects are invoked directly using the seL4 system calls described in Section 2.2. Note that Endpoint objects may queue threads either to send or to receive. If no receiver is ready, threads performing the `seL4_Send()` or `seL4_Call()` system calls will wait in a queue for the first available receiver. Likewise if no sender is ready, threads performing the `seL4_Wait()` system call or the second half of `seL4_ReplyWait()` will wait for the first available sender.

4.2.1 Endpoint Badges

Synchronous endpoint capabilities may be *minted* to create a new endpoint capability with a *badge* attached to it. The badge is a word of data that is associated with a particular endpoint capability. When a message is sent to an endpoint using a badged capability, the badge is transferred to the receiving thread’s **badge** register.

An endpoint capability with a zero badge is said to be *unbadged*. Such a capability can be badged with the `seL4_CNode_Mutate()` or `seL4_CNode_Mint()` invocations on the CNode containing the capability. Endpoint capabilities with badges cannot be unbadged, rebadged or used to create child capabilities with different badges.

4.2.2 Capability Transfer

Messages in seL4 may contain capabilities. Messages containing capabilities can be sent across synchronous endpoints, provided that the endpoint capability invoked by the sending thread has Grant rights. An attempt to transfer capabilities without Grant rights can still result in the message being sent, but no capabilities will be transferred.

Capabilities to be sent with a message are specified in the sending thread’s IPC buffer in the `caps` field. Each entry in that array is interpreted as a CPTR in the sending thread’s capability space. The number of capabilities to send is specified in the `extraCaps` field of the message tag.

The receiver specifies the slot, in which it is willing to receive a capability, with three fields within the IPC buffer: `receiveCNode`, `receiveIndex` and `receiveDepth`. These fields specify the root CNode, capability address and number of bits to resolve, respectively, to find the slot in which to put the capability. Capability addressing is described in Section 3.3.2.

A received capability has the same rights as the original except if the receiving endpoint capability does not have the Write right. In this case, the rights on the sent capability are *diminished*, by removing from the received copy of that capability the Write right.

Note that receiving threads may specify only one receive slot, whereas a sending thread may include multiple capabilities in the message. Messages containing more than one

capability may be interpreted by kernel objects. They may also be sent to receiving threads in the case where some of the extra capabilities in the message can be *unwrapped*.

If the n-th capability in the message refers to the same endpoint as the one the message is being sent through, it is *unwrapped*. Its badge is placed in the n-th position of the receiver's badges array and the n-th bit (counting from the least significant) is set in the `capsUnwrapped` field of the message tag. The capability itself is not transferred, so the receive slot may be used for another one.

If a receiver gets a message whose tag has an `extraCaps` of 2 and a `capsUnwrapped` of 2, then the first capability in the message was transferred to the specified receive slot and the second capability was unwrapped, placing its badge in `badges[1]`. There may have been a third capability in the sender's message which could not be unwrapped.

4.2.3 Errors

Errors in capability transfers can occur at two places: in the send phase or in the receive phase. In the send phase, all capabilities that the caller is attempting to send are looked up to ensure that they exist before the send is initiated in the kernel. If the lookup fails for any reason, `seL4_Send()` and `seL4_Call()` system calls immediately abort and no IPC or capability transfer takes place. The system call will return a lookup failure error as described in Section 9.1.

In the receive phase, seL4 transfers capabilities in the order that they are found in the sending thread's IPC buffer `caps` array and terminates as soon as an error is encountered. Possible error conditions are:

- A source capability cannot be looked up. Although the presence of the source capabilities is checked when the sending thread performs the send system call, this error may still occur. The sending thread may have been blocked on the endpoint for some time before it was paired with a receiving thread. During this time, its CSpace may have changed and the source capability pointers may no longer be valid.
- The destination slot cannot be looked up. Unlike the send system call, the `seL4_Wait()` system call does not check that the destination slot exists and is empty before it initiates the wait. Hence, the `seL4_Wait()` system call will not fail with an error if the destination slot is invalid and will instead transfer badged capabilities until an attempt to save a capability to the destination slot is made.
- The capability being transferred cannot be derived. See Section 3.1.4 for details.

An error will not void the entire transfer, it will just end it prematurely. The capabilities processed before the failure are still transferred and the `extraCaps` field in the receiver's IPC buffer is set to the number of capabilities transferred up to failure. No error message will be returned to the receiving thread in any of the above cases.

4.3 Asynchronous Endpoints

Asynchronous endpoints (AsyncEPs) allow senders to perform IPC without blocking. However, capabilities cannot be transferred over asynchronous endpoints.

Each asynchronous endpoint stores a single word of data. This word of data may be written to using `seL4_Notify()`, causing the first message register of the sending thread to be bitwise or-ed with the asynchronous endpoint's data word.

Note that `seL4_Notify()` is not a proper system call known by the kernel. Rather, it is a convenience wrapper provided by the seL4 userland library which calls `seL4_Send()` with a single parameter. It is useful for notifying an asynchronous endpoint.

Additionally, the `seL4_Wait()` system call may be used with an asynchronous endpoint, allowing the calling thread to retrieve all set bits from the asynchronous endpoint and clearing the endpoint in the process. If no `seL4_Notify()` system calls have taken place since the last `seL4_Wait()` call, the calling thread will block until the next `seL4_Notify()` takes place.

4.3.1 Asynchronous Endpoint Badges

Like synchronous endpoints, asynchronous endpoint capabilities may also be minted to create a new capability with a *badge* attached to it (see Section 4.2.1). The badge is a word of data that is associated with a particular endpoint capability. When a message is sent to an endpoint using a badged capability, the badge becomes part of the message received: in particular, the badge is bitwise or-ed with the badges from previous send system calls that have occurred since that last receive on the endpoint.

Like synchronous endpoints, an asynchronous endpoint capability with a zero badge is said to be *unbadged*. Such a capability can be badged with the `seL4_CNode_Mutate()` or `seL4_CNode_Mint()` invocations on the CNode containing the capability. Asynchronous endpoint capabilities with badges cannot be unbadged, rebadged or used to create child capabilities with different badges.

Chapter 5

Threads and Execution

5.1 Threads

seL4 provides threads to represent an execution context and manage processor time. A thread is represented in seL4 by its thread control block object (TCB). Each TCB has an associated CSpace (see Chapter 3) and VSpace (see Chapter 6) which may be shared with other threads. A TCB may also have an IPC buffer (see Chapter 4), which is used to pass extra arguments during IPC or kernel object invocation that do not fit in the architecture-defined message registers. While it is not compulsory that a thread has an IPC buffer, it will not be able to perform most kernel invocations, as they require cap transfer.

5.1.1 Thread Creation

Like other objects, TCBs are created with the `seL4.Untyped_Retype()` method (see Section 2.4). A newly created thread is initially inactive. It is configured by setting its CSpace and VSpace with the `seL4_TCB_SetSpace()` or `seL4_TCB_Configure()` methods and then calling `seL4_TCB_WriteRegisters()` with an initial stack pointer and instruction pointer. The thread can then be activated either by setting the `resume_target` parameter in the `seL4_TCB_WriteRegisters()` invocation to true or by separately calling the `seL4_TCB_Resume()` method.

5.1.2 Thread Deactivation

The `seL4_TCB_Suspend()` method deactivates a thread. A suspended thread might be left as-is, in which case it can later be resumed, and its suspended state can be retrieved with the `seL4_TCB_ReadRegisters()` and `seL4_TCB_CopyRegisters()` methods. It can also be reconfigured and reused or left suspended indefinitely if not needed. Threads will be automatically suspended when the last capability to their TCB is deleted.

5.1.3 Scheduling

seL4 uses a preemptive round-robin scheduler with 256 priority levels. When a thread creates or modifies another thread, it can only set the other thread's priority to be lower than or equal to its own. Thread priority can be set with `seL4_TCB_Configure()` and `seL4_TCB_SetPriority()` methods.

5.1.4 Exceptions

Each thread has an associated exception-handler endpoint. If the thread causes an exception, the kernel creates an IPC message with the relevant details and forwards this to a thread waiting on the endpoint. This thread can then take the appropriate action. Fault IPC messages are described in Section 5.2.

In order to enable exception handlers a capability to the exception-handler endpoint must exist in the CSpace of the thread that generates the exception. The exception-handler endpoint can be set with the `seL4_TCB_SetSpace()` or `seL4_TCB_Configure()` method. With these methods, a capability address for the exception handler can be associated with a thread. This address is then used to lookup the handler endpoint when an exception is generated. Note, however, that these methods make no attempt to check whether an endpoint capability exists at the specified address in the CSpace of the thread. The capability is only looked up when an exception actually happens and if the lookup fails then no exception message is delivered and the thread is suspended indefinitely.

The exception endpoint must have send and grant rights. Replying to the IPC restarts the thread. For certain exception types, the contents of the reply message may be used to set the values in the registers of the thread being restarted. See Section 5.2 for details.

5.1.5 Message Layout of the Read-/Write-Registers Methods

The registers of a thread can be read and written with the `seL4_TCB_ReadRegisters()` and `seL4_TCB_WriteRegisters()` methods. The register contents are transferred via the IPC buffer. The IPC buffer locations that registers are copied to/from are given below.

IA-32

Register	IPC Buffer location
EIP	IPCBuffer[0]
ESP	IPCBuffer[1]
EFLAGS	IPCBuffer[2]
EAX	IPCBuffer[3]
EBX	IPCBuffer[4]
ECX	IPCBuffer[5]
EDX	IPCBuffer[6]
ESI	IPCBuffer[7]
EDI	IPCBuffer[8]
EBP	IPCBuffer[9]
TLS_BASE	IPCBuffer[10]
FS	IPCBuffer[11]
GS	IPCBuffer[12]

ARM

Register	IPC Buffer location
PC	IPCBuffer[0]
SP	IPCBuffer[1]
CPSR	IPCBuffer[2]
R0-R1	IPCBuffer[3-4]
R8-R12	IPCBuffer[5-9]
R2-R7	IPCBuffer[10-15]
R14	IPCBuffer[16]

5.2 Faults

A thread's actions may result in a fault. Faults are delivered to the thread's exception handler so that it can take the appropriate action. The fault type is specified in the message label and is one of: `seL4_CapFault`, `seL4_VMFault`, `seL4_UnknownSyscall`, `seL4_UserException` or `seL4_Interrupt`.

5.2.1 Capability Faults

Capability faults may occur in two places. Firstly, a capability fault can occur when lookup of a capability referenced by a `seL4_Call()` or `seL4_Send()` system call failed (`seL4_NBSend()` calls on invalid capabilities silently fail). In this case, the capability on which the fault occurred may be the capability being invoked or an extra capability passed in the `caps` field in the IPC buffer.

Secondly, a capability fault can occur when `seL4_Wait()` is called on a capability that does not exist, is not an endpoint capability or does not have receive permissions.

Replying to the fault IPC will restart the faulting thread. The contents of the IPC message are given in Table 5.1.

Meaning	IPC buffer Location
Program counter to restart execution at	IPCBuffer[0]
Capability address	IPCBuffer[1]
In receive phase (1 if the fault happened during a wait system call, 0 otherwise)	IPCBuffer[2]
Lookup failure description. As described in Section 3.4	IPCBuffer[3..]

Table 5.1: Contents of an IPC message.

5.2.2 Unknown Syscall

This fault occurs when a thread executes a system call with a syscall number that is unknown to seL4. The register set of the faulting thread is passed to the thread's exception handler so that it may, for example, emulate the system call if a thread is being virtualised.

Replying to the fault IPC allows the thread to be restarted and/or the thread's register set to be modified. If the reply has a label of zero, the thread will be restarted. Additionally, if the message length is non-zero, the faulting thread's register set will be updated as shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. In this case, the number of registers updated is controlled with the length field of the message tag.

ARM

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
R0-R7	(same)	IPCBuffer[0-7]
FaultInstruction	(same)	IPCBuffer[8]
SP	(same)	IPCBuffer[9]
LR	(same)	IPCBuffer[10]
CPSR	(same)	IPCBuffer[11]
Syscall number	—	IPCBuffer[12]

Table 5.2: Unknown system call outcome on the ARM architecture.

IA-32

5.2.3 User Exception

User exceptions are used to deliver architecture-defined exceptions. For example, such an exception could occur if a user thread attempted to divide a number by zero.

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
EAX	(same)	IPCBuffer [0]
EBX	(same)	IPCBuffer [1]
ECX	(same)	IPCBuffer [2]
EDX	(same)	IPCBuffer [3]
ESI	(same)	IPCBuffer [4]
EDI	(same)	IPCBuffer [5]
EBP	(same)	IPCBuffer [6]
ESP	(same)	IPCBuffer [7]
EFLAGS	(same)	IPCBuffer [8]
Syscall number	—	IPCBuffer [9]

Table 5.3: Unknown system call outcome on the IA-32 architecture.

Replying to the fault IPC allows the thread to be restarted and/or the thread's register set to be modified. If the reply has a label of zero, the thread will be restarted. Additionally, if the message length is non-zero, the faulting thread's register set will be updated as shown in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. In this case, the number of registers updated is controlled with the length field of the message tag.

ARM

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
FaultInstruction	(same)	IPCBuffer [0]
SP	(same)	IPCBuffer [1]
CPSR	(same)	IPCBuffer [2]
Exception number	—	IPCBuffer [3]
Exception code	—	IPCBuffer [4]

Table 5.4: User exception outcome on the ARM architecture.

IA-32

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
EIP	(same)	IPCBuffer [0]
ESP	(same)	IPCBuffer [1]
EFLAGS	(same)	IPCBuffer [2]
Exception number	—	IPCBuffer [3]
Exception code	—	IPCBuffer [4]

Table 5.5: User exception outcome on the IA-32 architecture.

5.2.4 VM Fault

The thread caused a page fault. Replying to the fault IPC will restart the thread. The contents of the IPC message are given below.

Meaning	IPC buffer location
Program counter to restart execution at.	IPCBuffer[0]
Address that caused the fault.	IPCBuffer[1]
Instruction fault (1 if the fault was caused by an instruction fetch).	IPCBuffer[2]
Fault status register (FSR). Contains information about the cause of the fault. Architecture dependent.	IPCBuffer[3]

Chapter 6

Address Spaces and Virtual Memory

A virtual address space in seL4 is called a VSpace. In a similar way to a CSpace (see Chapter 3), a VSpace is composed of objects provided by the microkernel. Unlike CSpaces, these objects for managing virtual memory largely correspond to those of the hardware; that is, a page directory pointing to page tables, which in turn map physical frames. The kernel also includes ASID Pool and ASID Control objects for tracking the status of address spaces.

These VSpace-related objects are sufficient to implement the hardware data structures required to create, manipulate, and destroy virtual memory address spaces. It should be noted that, as usual, the manipulator of a virtual memory space needs the appropriate capabilities to the required objects.

6.1 Overview

IA-32 IA-32 processors have a two-level page-table structure. The top-level page directory covers a 4 GiB range and each page table covers a 4 MiB range. Frames can be 4 KiB or 4 MiB. Before a 4KiB frame can be mapped, a page table covering the range that the frame will be mapped into must have been mapped, otherwise seL4 will return an error. 4 MiB frames are mapped directly into the page directory, thus, a page table does not need to be mapped first.

ARM ARM processors also have a two-level page-table structure. The top-level page directory covers a range of 4 GiB and each page table covers a 1 MiB range. Four page sizes are allowed: 4 KiB, 64 KiB, 1 MiB and 16 MiB. 4 KiB and 64 KiB pages are mapped into the second-level page table. Before they can be mapped, a page table covering the range that they will be mapped into must have been installed. 1 MiB and 16 MiB pages are installed directly into the page directory such that it is not necessary to map a page table first. Pages of 4 KiB and 1 MiB size occupy one slot in a page table and the page directory, respectively. Pages of 64 KiB and 16 MiB size occupy 16 slots in a page table and the page directory, respectively.

6.2 Objects

Page Directory The Page Directory (PD) is the top-level page table of the two-level page table structure. It has a hardware-defined format, but conceptually contains a number of page directory entries (PDEs). The Page Directory has no methods itself, but it is used as an argument to several other virtual-memory related object invocations.

Page Table The Page Table (PT) object forms the second level of the page-table structure. It contains a number of slots, each of which contains a page-table entry (PTE).

Page Table objects possess only two methods:

```
seL4_ARM_PageTable_Map()
seL4_IA32_PageTable_Map()
```

Takes a Page Directory capability as an argument, and installs a reference to the invoked Page Table in a specified slot in the Page Directory.

```
seL4_ARM_PageTable_Unmap()
seL4_IA32_PageTable_Unmap()
```

Removes the reference to the invoked Page Table from its containing Page Directory.

Page A Page object is a region of physical memory that is used to implement virtual memory pages in a virtual address space. The Page object has the following methods:

```
seL4_ARM_Page_Map()
seL4_IA32_Page_Map()
```

Takes a Page Directory capability as an argument and installs a reference to the given Page in the PD or PT slot corresponding to the given address.

```
seL4_ARM_Page_Remap()
seL4_IA32_Page_Remap()
```

Changes the permissions of an existing mapping.

```
seL4_ARM_Page_Unmap()
seL4_IA32_Page_Unmap()
```

Removes an existing mapping.

The virtual address for a Page mapping must be aligned to the size of the Page and must be mapped to a suitable Page Directory or Page Table. To map a page readable, the capability to the page that is being invoked must have read permissions. To map the page writable, the capability must have write permissions. The requested mapping permissions are specified with an argument of type `seL4_CapRights` given to the `seL4_ARM_Page_Map()` or `seL4_IA32_Page_Map()` method. `seL4_CanRead` and `seL4_CanWrite` are the only valid permissions on both ARM and IA-32 architectures. If the capability does not have sufficient permissions to authorise the given mapping,

then the mapping permissions are silently downgraded.

ASID Control For internal kernel book-keeping purposes, there is a fixed maximum number of applications the system can support. In order to manage this limited resource, the microkernel provides an ASID Control capability. The ASID Control capability is used to generate a capability that authorises the use of a subset of available address-space identifiers. This newly created capability is called an ASID Pool. ASID Control only has a single method:

```
seL4_ARM_ASIDControl_MakePool()
seL4_IA32_ASIDControl_MakePool()
```

Together with a capability to Untyped Memory as argument creates an ASID Pool.

The untyped capability given to the `seL4_ARM_ASIDControl_MakePool()` call must represent a 4K memory object. This will create an ASID pool with enough space for 1024 VSpaces.

ASID Pool An ASID Pool confers the right to create a subset of the available maximum applications. For a VSpace to be usable by an application, it must be assigned to an ASID. This is done using a capability to an ASID Pool. The ASID Pool object has a single method:

```
seL4_ARM_ASIDPool_Assign()
seL4_IA32_ASIDPool_Assign()
```

Assigns an ASID to the VSpace associated with the Page Directory passed in as an argument.

6.3 Mapping Attributes

A parameter of type `seL4_ARM_VMAttributes` or `seL4_IA32_VMAttributes` is used to specify the cache behavior of the page being mapped; possible values for ARM are shown in Table 6.1 and values for IA-32 are shown in Table 6.2.

Attribute	Meaning
<code>seL4_ARM_PageCacheable</code>	Enable data in this mapping to be cached
<code>seL4_ARM_ParityEnabled</code>	Enable parity checking for this mapping

Table 6.1: Virtual memory attributes for ARM page table entries.

6.4 Sharing Memory

seL4 does not allow Page Tables to be shared, but does allow pages to be shared between address spaces. To share a page, the capability to the Page must first be duplicated

Attribute	Meaning
<code>seL4_IA32_CacheDisabled</code>	Prevent data in this mapping from being cached
<code>seL4_IA32_WriteThrough</code>	Enable write through cacheing for this mapping

Table 6.2: Virtual memory attributes for IA32 page table entries.

using the `seL4_CNode_Copy()` method and the new copy must be used in the `seL4_ARM_Page_Map()` or `seL4_IA32_Page_Map()` method that maps the page into the second address space. Attempting to map the same capability twice will result in an error.

6.5 Page Faults

Page faults are reported to the exception handler of the executed thread. See Section 5.2.4.

Chapter 7

Hardware I/O

7.1 Interrupt Delivery

Interrupts are delivered in seL4 through AsyncEP objects. A thread may configure the kernel to send a message to a particular AsyncEP object each time a certain interrupt triggers. Threads may then wait for the interrupts to occur by calling `seL4.Wait()` on that AsyncEP. Each bit n in the message content (modulo the word size) corresponds to whether IRQ n was asserted; this allows a thread to multiplex the handling of multiple interrupts through a single AsyncEP.

IRQHandler capabilities represent the ability of a thread to configure a certain interrupt. They have three methods:

`seL4_IRQHandler_SetEndpoint()` specifies the AsyncEP that the kernel should `notify()` when an interrupt occurs. A driver may then call `seL4.Wait()` on this endpoint to wait for interrupts to arrive.

`seL4_IRQHandler_Ack()` informs the kernel that the userspace driver has finished processing the interrupt and the microkernel can send further pending or new interrupts to the application.

`seL4_IRQHandler_Clear()` de-registers the AsyncEP from the IRQHandler object.

When the system first starts, no IRQHandler capabilities are present. Instead, the initial thread's CSpace contains a single IRQControl capability. This capability may be used to produce a single IRQHandler capability for each interrupt available in the system. Typically, the initial thread of a system will determine which IRQs are required by other components in the system, produce an IRQHandler capability for each interrupt, and then delegate the resulting capabilities as appropriate. IRQControl has one method:

`seL4_IRQControl_Get()` creates an IRQHandler capability for the specified interrupt source.

7.2 IA-32-Specific I/O

7.2.1 I/O Ports

On IA-32 platforms, seL4 provides access to I/O ports to user-level threads. Access to I/O ports is controlled by IO Port capabilities. Each IO Port capability identifies a range of ports that can be accessed with it. Reading from I/O ports is accomplished with the `seL4_IA32_IOPort_In8()`, `seL4_IA32_IOPort_In16()`, and `seL4_IA32_IOPort_In32()` methods, which allow for reading of 8-, 16- and 32-bit quantities. Similarly, writing to I/O ports is accomplished with the `seL4_IA32_IOPort_Out8()`, `seL4_IA32_IOPort_Out16()`, and `seL4_IA32_IOPort_Out32()` methods. Each of these methods takes as arguments an IO Port capability and an unsigned integer `port`, which indicates the I/O port to read from or write to, respectively. In each case, `port` must be within the range of I/O ports identified by the given IO Port capability in order for the method to succeed.

At system initialisation, the initial thread's CSpace contains the master IO Port capability, which allows access to all I/O ports. Other IO Port capabilities, which authorise access to a specific range of I/O Ports, may be derived from this master capability using the `seL4_CNode_Mint()` method. The range of I/O ports that the newly created capability should identify are specified via the 32-bit `badge` argument provided to `seL4_CNode_Mint()`. The first port number in the range occupies the top 16 bits of `badge`, while the last port number in the range occupies the bottom 16 bits. The range is interpreted as being inclusive of these two numbers.

The I/O port methods return error codes upon failure. A `seL4_IllegalOperation` code is returned if port access is attempted outside the range allowed by the IO Port capability. Since invocations that read from I/O ports are required to return two values – the value read and the error code – a structure containing two members, `result` and `error`, is returned from these API calls.

7.2.2 I/O Space

I/O devices capable of DMA present a security risk because the CPU's MMU is bypassed when the device accesses memory. In seL4, device drivers run in user space to keep them out of the trusted computing base. A malicious or buggy device driver may, however, program the device to access or corrupt memory that is not part of its address space, thus subverting security. To mitigate this threat, seL4 provides support for the IOMMU on Intel IA-32-based platforms. An IOMMU allows memory to be remapped from the device's point of view. It acts as an MMU for the device, restricting the regions of system memory that it can access. More information can be obtained from Intel's IOMMU documentation [Int11].

seL4-based systems that wish to utilise DMA must have an IOMMU. This restriction results from the fact that seL4 provides no way to obtain the physical address of a Page from its capability. Hence, applications are unable to accurately instruct devices, at which address they should directly address the physical memory. Instead, frames of memory must be mapped into the device's address space using seL4's IOMMU primitives.

Two new objects are provided by the kernel to abstract the IOMMU:

IOSpace This object represents the address space associated with a hardware device on the PCI bus. It represents the right to modify a device's memory mappings.

IOPageTable This object represents a node in the multilevel page-table structure used by IOMMU hardware to translate hardware memory accesses.

Page capabilities are used to represent the actual frames that are mapped into the I/O address space. A Page can be mapped into either a VSpace or an IOspace but never into both at the same time.

IOspace and VSpace fault handling differ significantly. VSpace page faults are redirected to the thread's exception handler (see Section 5.2), which can take the appropriate action and restart the thread at the faulting instruction. There is no concept of an exception handler for an IOspace. Instead, faulting transactions are simply aborted; the device driver must correct the cause of the fault and retry the DMA transaction.

An initial master IOspace capability is provided in the initial thread's CSpace. An IOspace capability for a specific device is created by using the `seL4_CNode_Mint()` method, passing the PCI identifier of the device as the low 16 bits of the `badge` argument, and a Domain ID as the high 16 bits of the `badge` argument. PCI identifiers are explained fully in the PCI specification [SA99], but are briefly described here. A PCI identifier is a 16-bit quantity. The first 8 bits identify the bus that the device is on. The next 5 bits are the device identifier: the number of the device on the bus. The last 3 bits are the function number. A single device may consist of several independent functions, each of which may be addressed by the PCI identifier. Domain IDs are explained fully in the Intel IOMMU documentation [Int11]. There is presently no way to query seL4 for how many Domain IDs are supported by the IOMMU and the `seL4_CNode_Mint()` method will fail if an unsupported value is chosen.

The IOMMU page-table structure has three levels. Page tables are mapped into an IOspace using the `seL4_IA32_IOPageTable_Map()` method. This method takes the IOPageTable to map, the IOspace to map into and the address to map at. Three levels of page tables must be mapped before a frame can be mapped successfully. A frame is mapped with the `seL4_IA32_Page_MapIO()` method whose parameters are analogous to the corresponding method that maps Pages into VSpaces (see Chapter 6), namely `seL4_IA32_Page_Map()`.

Unmapping is accomplished with the usual unmap (see Chapter 6) API call, `seL4_IA32_Page_Unmap()`.

More information about seL4's IOMMU abstractions can be found in [Pal09].

Chapter 8

System Bootstrapping

8.1 Initial Thread's Environment

The seL4 kernel creates a minimal boot environment for the initial thread. This environment consists of the initial thread's TCB, CSpace and VSpace, consisting of frames that contain the userland image (code/data of the initial thread) and the IPC buffer. The initial thread's CSpace consists of exactly one CNode which contains capabilities to the initial thread's own resources as well as to all available global resources. The CNode size can be configured at compile time (default is 2^{12} slots), but the guard is always chosen so that the CNode resolves exactly 32 bits. This means, the first slot of the CNode has CPTR 0x0, the second slot has CPTR 0x1 etc.

The first 11 slots contain specific capabilities as listed in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Initial Thread's CNode Content

CPTR	Enum Constant	Capability
0x0	<code>seL4_CapNull</code>	null
0x1	<code>seL4_CapInitThreadTCB</code>	initial thread's TCB
0x2	<code>seL4_CapInitThreadCNode</code>	initial thread's CNode
0x3	<code>seL4_CapInitThreadPD</code>	initial thread's page directory
0x4	<code>seL4_CapIRQControl</code>	global IRQ controller (see Section 7.1)
0x5	<code>seL4_CapASIDControl</code>	global ASID controller (see Chapter 6)
0x6	<code>seL4_CapInitThreadASIDPool</code>	initial thread's ASID pool (see Chapter 6)
0x7	<code>seL4_CapIOPort</code>	global I/O port cap, null cap if unsupported (see Section 7.2.1)
0x8	<code>seL4_CapIOSpace</code>	global I/O space cap, null cap if unsupported (see Section 7.2.2)
0x9	<code>seL4_CapBootInfoFrame</code>	BootInfo frame (see Section 8.2)
0xa	<code>seL4_CapInitThreadIPCBuffer</code>	initial thread's IPC buffer (see Section 4.1)

8.2 BootInfo Frame

CNode slots with CPTR 0xb and above are filled dynamically during bootstrapping. Their exact contents depend on the userland image size, platform configuration (devices) etc. In order to tell the initial thread which capabilities are stored where in its CNode, the kernel provides a *BootInfo Frame* which is mapped into the initial thread's address space. The mapped address is chosen by the kernel and given to the initial thread via a CPU register. The initial thread can access this address through the function `seL4_GetBootInfo()`.

The BootInfo Frame contains the C struct described in Table 8.2. It is defined in the seL4 userland library. Besides talking about capabilities, it also informs the initial thread about the current platform's configuration.

The type `seL4_SlotRegion` is a C struct which contains `start` and `end` slot CPTRs. It denotes a region of slots in the initial thread's CNode, starting with CPTR `start` and with `end` being the CPTR of the first slot after the region ends, i.e. `end - 1` points to the last slot of the region.

Table 8.2: BootInfo Struct

Field Type	Field Name	Description
<code>seL4_Word</code>	<code>nodeID</code>	node ID (see Section 8.4)
<code>seL4_Word</code>	<code>numNodes</code>	number of nodes (see Section 8.4)
<code>seL4_Word</code>	<code>numIOPTLevels</code>	number of I/O page-table levels (0 if no IOMMU)
<code>seL4_IPCBuffer*</code>	<code>ipcBuffer</code>	pointer to the initial thread's IPC buffer
<code>seL4_SlotRegion</code>	<code>empty</code>	empty slots (null caps)
<code>seL4_SlotRegion</code>	<code>sharedFrames</code>	see Section 8.4
<code>seL4_SlotRegion</code>	<code>userImageFrames</code>	frames containing the userland image
<code>seL4_SlotRegion</code>	<code>userImagePTs</code>	page tables covering the userland image
<code>seL4_SlotRegion</code>	<code>untyped</code>	untyped-memory capabilities
<code>seL4_Word[]</code>	<code>untypedPaddrList</code>	array of untyped-memory physical addresses
<code>uint8_t[]</code>	<code>untypedSizeBitsList</code>	array of untyped-memory sizes (2^n bytes)
<code>uint8_t</code>	<code>initThreadCNodeSizeBits</code>	CNode size (2^n slots)
<code>seL4_Word</code>	<code>numDeviceRegions</code>	number of device memory regions
<code>seL4_DeviceRegion[]</code>	<code>deviceRegions</code>	device memory regions (see Table 8.3)

The capabilities in `userImageFrames` and `userImagePTs` are ordered, i.e. the first

capability references the first frame of the userland image etc. Userland always knows to which virtual addresses its own code and data is mapped (e.g. in GCC, with the standard linker script, the symbols `_start` and `_end` are available). Userland can therefore infer the virtual address behind each userland frame and page-table cap.

Untyped memory is given in no particular order. The array entry `untypedSizeBitsList[i]` stores the untyped-memory size (2^n bytes) of the i -th untyped cap of the slot region `untyped`. Therefore, the array length is at least `untyped.end - untyped.start`. The actual length is hardcoded in the kernel and irrelevant to the reader of the array. The same is true for the array `untypedPaddrList`. For each untyped-memory capability, it stores the physical addresses backing the untyped memory. This allows userland to infer physical memory addresses of retyped frames and use them to initiate DMA transfers when no IOMMU is available. The kernel makes no guarantees about certain sizes of untyped memory being available except that it provides a compile-time-configurable minimum number of 4K untyped capabilities (default is 12).

Table 8.3: DeviceRegion Struct

Field Type	Field Name	Description
seL4_Word	<code>basePaddr</code>	physical base address of the device region
seL4_Word	<code>frameSizeBits</code>	size (2^n bytes) of the frames used
seL4_SlotRegion	<code>frames</code>	capabilities to the frames covering the region

The kernel creates frames covering each physical memory region associated with a memory-mapped device. These device regions are either hardcoded (e.g. on embedded platforms) or discovered at boot time by the kernel through a PCI bus scan. The physical base address of each region is stored in `basePaddr`. The slot region `frames` identifies all frame caps used to back this region. They are ordered, so the first frame of the region is referenced by the first cap in this slot region and is backed by the physical address `basePaddr`. All frames have the same size: $2^{\text{frameSizeBits}}$ bytes. Hence, the size of the whole region is: `(frames.end - frames.start) << frameSizeBits`

The array `deviceRegions` of the `BootInfo` struct stores all available device regions (i.e. their structs). There are `numDeviceRegions` of them available in the array.

If the platform has an seL4-supported IOMMU, `numIOPTLevels` contains the number of IOMMU-page-table levels. This information is needed by userland when constructing an IOMMU address space (`IOSpace`). If there is no IOMMU support, `numIOPTLevels` is 0.

8.3 Boot Command-line Arguments

On IA-32, seL4 accepts boot command-line arguments which are passed to the kernel via a multiboot-compliant bootloader (e.g. GRUB, syslinux). Multiple arguments are separated from each other by whitespace. Two forms of arguments are accepted: (1) key-value arguments of the form “key=value” and (2) single keys of the form “key”. The value field of the key-value form may be a string, a decimal integer, a hexadecimal

integer beginning with “0x”, or an integer list where list elements are separated by commas. Keys and values can’t have any whitespace in them and there can be no whitespace before or after an “=” or a comma either. Arguments are listed in Table 8.4 along with their default values (if left unspecified).

Table 8.4: IA-32 boot command-line arguments

Key	Value	Default
<code>console_port</code>	I/O-port base of the serial port that the kernel prints to (if compiled in debug mode)	0x3f8
<code>debug_port</code>	I/O-port base of the serial port that is used for kernel debugging (if compiled in debug mode)	0x3f8
<code>disable_iommu</code>	none	The IOMMU is enabled by default on VT-d-capable platforms
<code>max_num_nodes</code>	Maximum number of seL4 nodes that can be started up (see Section 8.4)	1
<code>num_sh_frames</code>	Number of frames shared between seL4 nodes (see Section 8.4)	0

8.4 Multikernel Bootstrapping

On ARM, seL4 is uniprocessor only and does not support multikernel [BBD⁺09] bootstrapping. Therefore, the field `nodeID` of the `BootInfo` struct will always be 0, `numNodes` will be 1 and `sharedFrames` will be an empty region.

On IA-32, seL4 can be bootstrapped as a multikernel by setting the boot command-line argument `max_num_nodes` to a value >1 . Each available CPU core will then run one isolated *node* of seL4, up to the maximum number specified. The available physical memory is partitioned equally between nodes. All device frames are given to all nodes. The nodes’ initial threads have to coordinate access to these device frames, e.g. by defining which node is responsible for which device. IOMMU management can only be performed by the first node, the other nodes are not given a global IOSpace capability. There is also a hard upper limit of number of nodes defined at compile time (default is 8, but it can be increased to 256).

Nodes are isolated from each other, except for *shared frames*. When bootstrapping, the kernel creates a number of 4K userland frames which are shared between nodes. This number can be configured via the boot command-line argument `num_sh_frames`. The shared frames will appear in the `CNode` of each node’s initial thread. They are given to each initial thread in the same order. In the `BootInfo` struct, the field `sharedFrames` contains their slot region.

Shared frames can be used by userland to implement shared data structures, message passing and synchronisation mechanisms. Individual frames can, for example, be minted and handed out to subsystems. This allows connecting them across nodes in a fine-grained manner. Each node has a node ID (field `nodeID` in `BootInfo`) whereas the number of nodes can be obtained from the field `numNodes`.

Userland images are given to the kernel by a multiboot-compliant bootloader (e.g. GRUB, `syslinux`) via *boot modules*. Each boot module contains an ELF file of a userland image. If there is only one userland image, each node will get its own copy of that userland image. If multiple userland images are given, the first node gets the first image, the second node the second image etc. If there are more nodes than images, each remaining node gets a copy of the last image.

If the kernel is compiled in debug mode, each node can be assigned a separate console port and debug port (see Table 8.4) which is done by specifying an array of I/O-port base addresses. For example, `console_port=0x3f8,0x2f8,0x3e8,0x2e8` assigns port 0x3f8 to node 0, port 0x2f8 to node 1, etc. The remaining nodes have no assigned port and produce no console output. The argument `debug_port` works in exactly the same way.

Further details can be obtained from [vT10] which mainly talks about the formal aspects of seL4's multikernel version but also contains details about the bootstrapping. More recent additional information can be found in [vT12], which focusses less on the formal side and more on the OS side.

Chapter 9

seL4 API Reference

9.1 Error Codes

Invoking a capability with invalid parameters will result in an error. seL4 system calls return an error code in the message tag and a short error description in the message registers to aid the programmer in determining the cause of errors.

9.1.1 Invalid Argument

A non-capability argument is invalid.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4_InvalidArgument</code>
<code>IPCBuffer[0]</code>	Invalid argument number

9.1.2 Invalid Capability

A capability argument is invalid.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4_InvalidCapability</code>
<code>IPCBuffer[0]</code>	Invalid capability argument number

9.1.3 Illegal Operation

The requested operation is not permitted.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4_IllegalOperation</code>

9.1.4 Range Error

An argument is out of the allowed range.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4.RangeError</code>
<code>IPCBuffer[0]</code>	Minimum allowed value
<code>IPCBuffer[1]</code>	Maximum allowed value

9.1.5 Alignment Error

A supplied argument does not meet the alignment requirements.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4.AlignmentError</code>

9.1.6 Failed Lookup

A capability could not be looked up.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4.FailedLookup</code>
<code>IPCBuffer[0]</code>	1 if the lookup failed for a source capability, 0 otherwise
<code>IPCBuffer[1]</code>	Type of lookup failure
<code>IPCBuffer[2..]</code>	Lookup failure description as described in Section 3.4

9.1.7 Delete First

A destination slot specified in the syscall arguments is occupied.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4.DeleteFirst</code>

9.1.8 Revoke First

The object currently has other objects derived from it and the requested invocation cannot be performed until either these objects are deleted or the revoke invocation is performed on the capability.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4.RevokeFirst</code>

9.1.9 Not Enough Memory

The Untyped Memory object does not have enough unallocated space to complete the `seL4_Untyped_Retype()` request.

Field	Meaning
Label	<code>seL4_NotEnoughMemory</code>
<code>IPCBuffer[0]</code>	Amount of memory available in bytes

9.2 System Calls

9.2.1 Send

```
static inline void seL4_Send
```

Send to a capability

Type	Name	Description
<code>seL4_CPtr</code>	<code>dest</code>	The capability to be invoked.
<code>seL4_MessageInfo</code>	<code>msgInfo</code>	The messageinfo structure for the IPC.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: See Section 2.2

9.2.2 Wait

```
static inline seL4_MessageInfo seL4_Wait
```

Wait on an endpoint

Type	Name	Description
<code>seL4_CPtr</code>	<code>src</code>	The capability to be invoked.
<code>seL4_Word*</code>	<code>sender</code>	The badge of the endpoint capability that was invoked by the sender is written to this address.

Return value: A `seL4_MessageInfo` structure as described in Section 4.1.

Description: See Section 2.2

9.2.3 Call

```
static inline seL4_MessageInfo seL4_Call
```

Call a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr	dest	The capability to be invoked.
seL4_MessageInfo	msgInfo	The messageinfo structure for the IPC.

Return value: A `seL4_MessageInfo` structure as described in Section 4.1.

Description: See Section 2.2

9.2.4 Reply

```
static inline void seL4_Reply
```

Perform a send to a one-off reply capability stored when the thread was last called

Type	Name	Description
seL4_MessageInfo	msgInfo	The messageinfo structure for the IPC.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: See Section 2.2

9.2.5 Non-blocking Send

```
static inline void seL4_NBSend
```

Perform a non-blocking send to a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr	dest	The capability to be invoked.
seL4_MessageInfo	msgInfo	The messageinfo structure for the IPC.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: See Section 2.2

9.2.6 Reply Wait

```
static inline seL4_MessageInfo seL4_ReplyWait
```

Perform a reply followed by a wait in one system call

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr	dest	The capability to be invoked.
seL4_MessageInfo	msgInfo	The messageinfo structure for the IPC.
seL4_Word*	sender	The badge of the endpoint capability that was invoked by the sender is written to this address.

Return value: A `seL4_MessageInfo` structure as described in Section 4.1.

Description: See Section 2.2

9.2.7 Yield

```
static inline void seL4_Yield
```

Donate the remaining timeslice to a thread of the same priority

Type	Name	Description
void		

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: See Section 2.2

9.2.8 Notify

```
static inline void seL4_Notify
```

Send a one-word message

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr	dest	The capability to be invoked.
seL4_Word	msg	The single word to send.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: This is not a proper system call known by the kernel. Rather, it is a convenience wrapper provided by the seL4 userland library which calls `seL4_Send()` with a single parameter. It is useful for notifying an asynchronous endpoint.

See the description of `seL4_Send()` in Section 2.2

9.3 Architecture-Independent Object Methods

9.3.1 CNode - Copy

```
static inline int sel4_CNode_Copy
```

Copy a capability, setting its access rights whilst doing so

Type	Name	Description
sel4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
sel4_Word	dest_index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	dest_depth	Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find the destination slot.
sel4_CNode	src_root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the source CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
sel4_Word	src_index	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the root of the source CSpace.
uint8_t	src_depth	Number of bits of src_index to resolve to find the source slot.
sel4_CapRights	rights	The rights inherited by the new capability. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.2 CNode - Delete

```
static inline int seL4_CNode_Delete
```

Delete a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the capability. Resolved from the root of the _service parameter.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the capability being operated on.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.3 CNode - Mint

```
static inline int seL4_CNode_Mint
```

Copy a capability, setting its access rights and badge whilst doing so

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	dest_index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	dest_depth	Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find the destination slot.
seL4_CNode	src_root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the source CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	src_index	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the root of the source CSpace.
uint8_t	src_depth	Number of bits of src_index to resolve to find the source slot.
seL4_CapRights	rights	The rights inherited by the new capability. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
seL4_CapData	badge	Badge to be applied to the new capability.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.4 CNode - Move

```
static inline int seL4_CNode_Move
```

Move a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	<code>_service</code>	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	<code>dest_index</code>	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	<code>dest_depth</code>	Number of bits of <code>dest_index</code> to resolve to find the destination slot.
seL4_CNode	<code>src_root</code>	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the source CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	<code>src_index</code>	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the root of the source CSpace.
uint8_t	<code>src_depth</code>	Number of bits of <code>src_index</code> to resolve to find the source slot.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.5 CNode - Mutate

```
static inline int sel4_CNode_Mutate
```

Move a capability, setting its badge in the process

Type	Name	Description
sel4_CNode	<code>_service</code>	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
sel4_Word	<code>dest_index</code>	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	<code>dest_depth</code>	Number of bits of <code>dest_index</code> to resolve to find the destination slot.
sel4_CNode	<code>src_root</code>	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the source CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
sel4_Word	<code>src_index</code>	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the root of the source CSpace.
uint8_t	<code>src_depth</code>	Number of bits of <code>src_index</code> to resolve to find the source slot.
sel4_CapData	<code>badge</code>	Badge to be applied to the new capability.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.6 CNode - Recycle

```
static inline int seL4_CNode_Recycle
```

The recycle method is intended roughly as a short cut for reusing an object within the same protection domain. The method will first revoke the capability and will then reset some but not necessarily all aspects of an object to its neutral state. Recycling badged endpoint caps will only cancel IPCs for this badge. Recycled frames, page tables and directories should only be re-used in the same protection domain, not all authority to them is rescinded. For full reuse in a different protection domain, revoke and retype the untyped cap that was used to create the object. For the precise behaviour of recycle, see the formal specification.

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	<code>_service</code>	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	<code>index</code>	CPTR to the capability. Resolved from the root of the <code>_service</code> parameter.
uint8_t	<code>depth</code>	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the capability being operated on.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.7 CNode - Revoke

```
static inline int seL4_CNode_Revoke
```

Delete all child capabilities of a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the capability. Resolved from the root of the _service parameter.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the capability being operated on.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.8 CNode - Rotate

```
static inline int seL4_CNode_Rotate
```

Given 3 capability slots - a destination, pivot and source - move the capability in the pivot slot to the destination slot and the capability in the source slot to the pivot slot

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	<code>_service</code>	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the destination slot will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	<code>dest_index</code>	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved relative to <code>_service</code> . Must be empty unless it refers to the same slot as the source slot.
uint8_t	<code>dest_depth</code>	Depth to resolve <code>dest_index</code> to.
seL4_CapData	<code>dest_badge</code>	The new capdata for the capability that ends up in the destination slot.
seL4_CNode	<code>pivot_root</code>	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the pivot slot will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	<code>pivot_index</code>	CPTR to the pivot slot. Resolved relative to <code>pivot_root</code> . The resolved slot must not refer to the source or destination slots.
uint8_t	<code>pivot_depth</code>	Depth to resolve <code>pivot_index</code> to.
seL4_CapData	<code>pivot_badge</code>	The new capdata for the capability that ends up in the pivot slot.
seL4_CNode	<code>src_root</code>	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the source slot will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	<code>src_index</code>	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved relative to <code>src_root</code> .
uint8_t	<code>src_depth</code>	Depth to resolve <code>src_index</code> to.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.9 CNode - Save Caller

```
static inline int sel4_CNode_SaveCaller
```

Save the reply capability from the last time the thread was called in the thread's CSpace so that it can be invoked later

Type	Name	Description
sel4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
sel4_Word	index	CPTR to the capability. Resolved from the root of the _service parameter.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the capability being operated on.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

9.3.10 Debug - Halt

```
static inline void sel4_DebugHalt
```

Halt the system

Type	Name	Description
void		

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: Halts the system, if debugging is turned on.

9.3.11 Debug - Put Character

```
static inline void seL4_DebugPutChar
```

Print a character to the console

Type	Name	Description
char	c	The character to print.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: Prints a character to the serial port, if debugging is turned on.

9.3.12 IRQ Control - Get

```
static inline int seL4_IRQControl_Get
```

Create an IRQ handler capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IRQControl	_service	An IRQControl capability. This gives you the authority to make this call.
int	irq	The IRQ that you want this capability to handle.
seL4_CNode	root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find the destination slot.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.1

9.3.13 IRQ Handler - Acknowledge

```
static inline int sel4_IRQHandler_Ack
```

Acknowledge the receipt of an interrupt and re-enable it

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IRQHandler	_service	The IRQ handler capability.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.1

9.3.14 IRQ Handler - Clear

```
static inline int sel4_IRQHandler_Clear
```

Clear the handler capability from the IRQ slot

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IRQHandler	_service	The IRQ handler capability.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.1

9.3.15 IRQ Handler - Set Endpoint

```
static inline int seL4_IRQHandler_SetEndpoint
```

Set the endpoint which will receive interrupts controlled by the supplied IRQ handler capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IRQHandler	_service	The IRQ handler capability.
seL4_CPtr	endpoint	The endpoint which will receive the IRQs.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.1

9.3.16 TCB - Configure

```
static inline int sel4_TCB_Configure
```

Set the parameters of a TCB

Type	Name	Description
sel4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
sel4_Word	fault_ep	CPTR to the endpoint which receives IPCs when this thread faults. This capability is in the CSpace of the thread being configured.
uint8_t	priority	The thread's new priority.
sel4_CNode	cspace_root	The new CSpace root.
sel4_CapData	cspace_root_data	Optionally set the guard and guard size of the new root CNode. If set to zero, this parameter has no effect.
sel4_CNode	vspace_root	The new VSpace root.
sel4_CapData	vspace_root_data	Has no effect on IA-32 or ARM processors.
sel4_Word	buffer	Location of the thread's IPC buffer. Must be 512-byte aligned. The IPC buffer may not cross a page boundary.
sel4_CPtr	bufferFrame	Capability to a page containing the thread's IPC buffer.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.1

9.3.17 TCB - Copy Registers

```
static inline int seL4_TCB_CopyRegisters
```

Copy the registers from one thread to another

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	<code>_service</code>	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on. This is the destination TCB.
seL4_TCB	<code>source</code>	Cap to the source TCB.
bool	<code>suspend_source</code>	The invocation should also suspend the source thread.
bool	<code>resume_target</code>	The invocation should also resume the destination thread.
bool	<code>transfer_frame</code>	Frame registers should be transferred.
bool	<code>transfer_integer</code>	Integer registers should be transferred.
uint8_t	<code>arch_flags</code>	Architecture dependent flags. These have no meaning on either IA-32 or ARM.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: In the context of this function, frame registers are those that are read, modified or preserved by a system call and integer registers are those that are not. Refer to the seL4 userland library source for specifics. Section 5.1.2

9.3.18 TCB - Read Registers

```
static inline int sel4_TCB_ReadRegisters
```

Read a thread's registers

Type	Name	Description
sel4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
bool	suspend_source	The invocation should also suspend the source thread.
uint8_t	arch_flags	Architecture dependent flags. These have no meaning on either IA-32 or ARM.
sel4_Word	count	The number of registers to read.
sel4_UserContext*	regs	The structure to read the registers into.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.1.5

9.3.19 TCB - Resume

```
static inline int sel4_TCB_Resume
```

Resume a thread

Type	Name	Description
sel4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.1

9.3.20 TCB - Set IPC Buffer

```
static inline int seL4_TCB_SetIPCBuffer
```

Set a thread's IPC buffer

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
seL4_Word	buffer	Location of the thread's IPC buffer. Must be 512-byte aligned. The IPC buffer may not cross a page boundary.
seL4_CPtr	bufferFrame	Capability to a page containing the thread's IPC buffer.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Sections 5.1 and 4.1

9.3.21 TCB - Set Priority

```
static inline int seL4_TCB_SetPriority
```

Change a thread's priority

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
uint8_t	priority	The thread's new priority.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.1.3

9.3.22 TCB - Set Space

```
static inline int seL4_TCB_SetSpace
```

Set the fault endpoint, CSpace and VSpace of a thread

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	<code>_service</code>	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
seL4_Word	<code>fault_ep</code>	CPTR to the endpoint which receives IPCs when this thread faults. This capability is in the CSpace of the thread being configured.
seL4_CNode	<code>cspace_root</code>	The new CSpace root.
seL4_CapData	<code>cspace_root_data</code>	Optionally set the guard and guard size of the new root CNode. If set to zero, this parameter has no effect.
seL4_CNode	<code>vspace_root</code>	The new VSpace root.
seL4_CapData	<code>vspace_root_data</code>	Has no effect on IA-32 or ARM processors.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.1

9.3.23 TCB - Suspend

```
static inline int seL4_TCB_Suspend
```

Suspend a thread

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	<code>_service</code>	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.1.2

9.3.24 TCB - Write Registers

```
static inline int seL4_TCB_WriteRegisters
```

Set a thread's registers

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	<code>_service</code>	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
bool	<code>resume_target</code>	The invocation should also resume the destination thread.
uint8_t	<code>arch_flags</code>	Architecture dependent flags. These have no meaning on either IA-32 or ARM.
seL4_Word	<code>count</code>	The number of registers to be set.
seL4_UserContext*	<code>regs</code>	Data structure containing the new register values.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.1.5

9.3.25 Untyped - Retype

```
static inline int sel4.Untyped_Retype
```

Retype an untyped object

Type	Name	Description
sel4.Untyped	<code>_service</code>	CPTR to an untyped object.
int	<code>type</code>	The sel4 object type that we are retying to.
int	<code>size_bits</code>	Only valid for objects with various sizes. Explained below.
sel4.CNode	<code>root</code>	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the destination CSpace.
int	<code>node_index</code>	CPTR to the destination CNode. Resolved relative to the root parameter.
int	<code>node_depth</code>	Number of bits of <code>node_index</code> to translate when addressing the destination CNode.
int	<code>node_offset</code>	Number of slots into the node at which capabilities start being placed.
int	<code>num_objects</code>	Number of capabilities to create.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: Given a capability, `_service`, to an untyped object, creates `num_objects` of the requested type. Creates `num_objects` capabilities to the new objects starting at `node_offset` in the given CNode.

The retype method can be complex because multiple capabilities may be created and some objects such as CNodes may have varying sizes.

Most kernel objects have a fixed size, and hence no further information must be given to the kernel about them. CNodes and Untyped Memory however have a variable size, and so the user must additionally give a value in the `size_bits` parameter to specify the desired size for the objects to be created. For CNodes, the number of slots in each CNode is calculated as 2^{size_bits} and hence the required amount of memory for each is $16 * 2^{size_bits}$. For the case where Untyped Memory is being split into smaller blocks of Untyped Memory, the size of each of the resulting Untyped Memory blocks is calculated as 2^{size_bits} . If the size of the memory area needed (calculated by the object size multiplied by `num_objects`) is greater than the remaining unallocated memory of the untyped memory region, an error will result. Otherwise object allocation will proceed.

Allocation is performed by choosing the region of memory closest to the start of the untyped memory object that is both unallocated, and aligned to the size of the type of object(s) being created. This may leave unallocated gaps between objects in the parent untyped object, which are considered as allocated.

The retype method places capabilities to the objects produced at consecutive locations in a CNode. The CNode is specified by the `root`, `node_index` and `node_depth` param-

Object	Object Size
n -bit Untyped	2^n bytes (where $n \geq 4$)
n -slot CNode	$16n$ bytes (where $n \geq 2$)
Synchronous Endpoint	16 bytes
Asynchronous Endpoint	16 bytes
IRQ Control	—
IRQ Handler	—

Table 9.1: Platform Independent Object Sizes

eters (see Section 3.3.2). The `node_offset` parameter specifies the index in the CNode at which the first capability will be placed. The `num_objects` parameter specifies the number of capabilities (and, hence, objects) to create. All slots must be empty or an error will result. All resulting objects will be placed in the same CNode.

9.3.26 Summary of Object Sizes

When retyping untyped memory it is useful to know how much memory the object will require. Object sizes are summarised in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3.

IA-32 Object	Object Size
Thread Control Block	1KiB
IA32 4K Frame	4KiB
IA32 4M Frame	4MiB
IA32 Page Directory	4KiB
IA32 Page Table	4KiB
IA32 ASID Control	—
IA32 ASID Pool	4KiB
IA32 Port	—
IA32 IO Space	—
IA32 IO Page table	4KiB

Table 9.2: IA-32 Specific Object Sizes

ARM Object	Object Size
Thread Control Block	512 bytes
ARM Small Frame	4KiB
ARM Large Frame	64KiB
ARM Section	1MiB
ARM Supersection	16MiB
ARM Page Directory	16KiB
ARM Page Table	1KiB
ARM ASID Control	—
ARM ASID Pool	4KiB

Table 9.3: ARM Specific Object Sizes

9.4 IA-32-Specific Object Methods

9.4.1 IA32 ASID Control - Make Pool

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_ASIDControl_MakePool
```

Create an IA-32 ASID pool

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_ASIDControl	_service	The master ASIDControl capability.
sel4_Untyped	untyped	Capability to an untyped memory object that will become the pool. Must be 4K bytes.
sel4_CNode	root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
sel4_Word	index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the destination slot.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.4.2 IA32 ASID Pool - Assign

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_ASIDPool_Assign
```

Assign an ASID pool

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_ASIDPool	_service	The ASID pool which is being assigned to. Must not be full. Each ASID pool can contain 1024 entries.
sel4_IA32_PageDirectory	vroot	The page directory that is being assigned to an ASID pool. Must not already be assigned to an ASID pool.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.4.3 IA32 IO Port - In 8

```
static inline seL4_IA32_IOPort_In8_t seL4_IA32_IOPort_In8
```

Read 8 bits from an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
uint16_t	port	The port to read from.

Return value: A seL4_IA32_IOPort_In8_t structure as described in Section 7.2.1

Description: See Section 7.2.1

9.4.4 IA32 IO Port - In 16

```
static inline seL4_IA32_IOPort_In16_t seL4_IA32_IOPort_In16
```

Read 16 bits from an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
uint16_t	port	The port to read from.

Return value: A seL4_IA32_IOPort_In16_t structure as described in Section 7.2.1

Description: See Section 7.2.1

9.4.5 IA32 IO Port - In 32

```
static inline seL4_IA32_IOPort_In32_t seL4_IA32_IOPort_In32
```

Read 32 bits from an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
uint16_t	port	The port to read from.

Return value: A seL4_IA32_IOPort_In32_t structure as described in Section 7.2.1

Description: See Section 7.2.1

9.4.6 IA32 IO Port - Out 8

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_IOPort_Out8
```

Write 8 bits to an IO port

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
uint16_t	port	The port to write to.
uint8_t	data	Data to write to the IO port.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.2.1

9.4.7 IA32 IO Port - Out 16

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_IOPort_Out16
```

Write 16 bits to an IO port

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
uint16_t	port	The port to write to.
uint16_t	data	Data to write to the IO port.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.2.1

9.4.8 IA32 IO Port - Out 32

```
static inline int seL4_IA32_IOPort_Out32
```

Write 32 bits to an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
uint16_t	port	The port to write to.
uint32_t	data	Data to write to the IO port.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.2.1

9.4.9 IA32 IO Page Table - Map

```
static inline int seL4_IA32_IOPageTable_Map
```

Map a page table into an IOSpace

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPageTable	_service	The page table that is being mapped.
seL4_IA32_IOSpace	iospace	The IOSpace that the page is being mapped into.
seL4_Word	ioaddr	The address that the page is being mapped at.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.2.2

9.4.10 IA32 Page - Map IO

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_Page_MapIO
```

Map a page into an IOSpace

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_Page	_service	The frame that is being mapped.
sel4_IA32_IOSpace	iospace	The IOSpace that the frame is being mapped into.
sel4_CapRights	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
sel4_Word	ioaddr	The address that the frame is being mapped at.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 7.2.2

9.4.11 IA32 Page - Map

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_Page_Map
```

Map a page into an address space

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_Page	_service	Capability to the page to map.
sel4_IA32_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
sel4_Word	vaddr	Virtual address to map the page into.
sel4_CapRights	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
sel4_IA32_VMAAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 6.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.4.12 IA32 Page - Remap

```
static inline int seL4_IA32_Page_Remap
```

Remap a page

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_Page	_service	Capability to the page to map.
seL4_IA32_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
seL4_CapRights	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
seL4_IA32_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 6.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.4.13 IA32 Page - Unmap

```
static inline int seL4_IA32_Page_Unmap
```

Unmap a page

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_Page	_service	Capability to the page to unmap.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.4.14 IA32 Page Table - Map

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_PageTable.Map
```

Map a page table into an address space

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_PageTable	_service	Capability to the page table to map.
sel4_IA32_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
sel4_Word	vaddr	Virtual address to map the page into.
sel4_IA32_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 6.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.4.15 IA32 Page Table - Unmap

```
static inline int sel4_IA32_PageTable.Unmap
```

Unmap a page table from its address space and zero it out

Type	Name	Description
sel4_IA32_PageTable	_service	Capability to the page table to unmap.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5 ARM-Specific Object Methods

9.5.1 ARM ASID Control - Make Pool

```
static inline int seL4_ARM_ASIDControl_MakePool
```

Create an ASID Pool

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_ASIDControl	_service	The master ASIDControl capability.
seL4_Untyped	untyped	Capability to an untyped memory object that will become the pool. Must be 4K bytes.
seL4_CNode	root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the destination slot.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5.2 ARM ASID Pool - Assign

```
static inline int seL4_ARM_ASIDPool_Assign
```

Assign an ASID Pool

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_ASIDPool	_service	The ASID pool which is being assigned to. Must not be full. Each ASID pool can contain 1024 entries.
seL4_ARM_PageDirectory	vroot	The page directory that is being assigned to an ASID pool. Must not already be assigned to an ASID pool.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5.3 ARM Page - Flush Caches

```
static inline int sel4_ARM_Page_FlushCaches
```

Flush a cache range

Type	Name	Description
sel4_ARM_Page	_service	The page whose contents will be flushed.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5.4 ARM Page - Map

```
static inline int sel4_ARM_Page_Map
```

Map a page into an address space

Type	Name	Description
sel4_ARM_Page	_service	Capability to the page to map.
sel4_ARM_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
sel4_Word	vaddr	Virtual address to map the page into.
sel4_CapRights	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
sel4_ARM_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 6.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5.5 ARM Page - Remap

```
static inline int seL4_ARM_Page_Remap
```

Remap a page

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page	_service	Capability to the page to remap.
seL4_ARM_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
seL4_CapRights	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
seL4_ARM_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 6.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5.6 ARM Page - Unmap

```
static inline int seL4_ARM_Page_Unmap
```

Unmap a page

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page	_service	Capability to the page to unmap.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5.7 ARM Page Table - Map

```
static inline int seL4_ARM_PageTable_Map
```

Map a page table into an address space

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_PageTable	_service	Capability to the page table that will be mapped.
seL4_ARM_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
seL4_Word	vaddr	Virtual address to map the page into.
seL4_ARM_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 6.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

9.5.8 ARM Page Table - Unmap

```
static inline int seL4_ARM_PageTable_Unmap
```

Unmap a page table from its address space and zero it out

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_PageTable	_service	Capability to the page table that will be unmapped.

Return value: A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 9.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 6

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